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THE SUPREME COURT: SOME INTERPRETATIONS
OF CONGRESSIONAL, EXECUTIVE AND
STATE POWER
FRANCIS P. KELLY

t

February 5, 1937. Franklin D. Roosevelt, President
of the United States, had, the preceding November, been
overwhelmingly 1 chosen by the people to serve an additional
four years in office. Now he had embarked 2 upon his second
term. Confident of his power,3 he this day sent an historic
message 4 to the Congress. The message asked that for every
judge of a court of the United States who had reached the
age of seventy years, having held a commission as judge of
any such court or courts at least ten years, continuously or
otherwise, and who did not resign or retire within six months
thereafter, the President, by and with the consent of the
Senate, might appoint an additional judge. The number of
judges of any court was to be permanently increased by the
T WAs

t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1 Governor Alfred M. Landon of Kansas, the Republican candidate for
President in 1936, received 16,679,583 popular votes and eight electoral votes
(from Maine and Vermont). President Roosevelt's popular total was 27,476,673.
The President carried forty-six States of the Union, for the greatest electoral
triumph in the history of the United States. STONE, THEY ALSO RAN 317
(1944). Book Seven, Ch. IV of this work contains a most interesting account
of this campaign.
2 The Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, adopted February 6, 1933,
had changed the inaugural date for the President and Vice-President from
March 4 to January 20.
3 Even the warmest admirers of the late President must concede that election to his second term did not blunt his drive for office. Compare the language of John L. Lewis on October 25, 1940, in denouncing a third term:
"How startling, therefore, is the spectacle of a President who is disinclined
to surrender . . . power, in keeping with the traditions of the republic. The
suggestion of a third term under these conditions is less than wholesome or
healthy. Personal craving for power, the overweening abnormal and selfish
craving for increased power, is a thing to alarm and dismay.
... ALINSKY,
JOHN L. LEwis: AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 188

4H.R. Doc. No. 142, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
the message, see 81 CONG. REc. 893 (1937).

22

(1949).
For the full text of
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number appointed thereto under the section just summarized. 5
The Supreme Court of the United States was not to be increased beyond fifteen members. 6
Though couched in general terms as applying to the
federal judiciary as a whole, the President's proposal was
immediately recognized 7 as essentially an attack upon the
Supreme Court; all else was incidental. Certainly, the Court
had not been kind to the legislative program popularly known
as the "New Deal." From late 1933 to the middle of 1936,
no less than twelve acts of Congress had been held unconstitutional. 8 To leading supporter, of the President, this seemed
like judicial nullification."
The President himself soon abandoned any pretense that
his plan was designed to cure a disease endemic to the entire
judicial system of the United States. In a radio address on
March 9, 1937,10 he strongly castigated the role that the
Supreme Court assumed. He accused the Court of not pulling in harness with the other two branches; 'I of setting up
a government not of laws but of men; 12 of being out of touch
with the times; 13 of being composed of men selfishly dis5Id.§1(b).
61d. § 1(b) (1).
7The radio statements of Congressman Treadway (R., Mass.) and Senator William H. King (D., Utah) on the very day of the delivery of the
message offer abundant proof of this fact. Similarly, Congressman Noah M.
Mason (R., Ill.) commented on February 11, 1937: "Mr. Speaker, from the
letters coming to Members of Congress, and telegrams from all over this

great land of ours today-north and south, east and west-I am convinced that
from pulpit, from banquet halls, from legislative halls, from the streets, figuratively speaking, the patriots of this Nation of both parties are proposing
and drinking to the great toast 'Our Federal Constitution; it must be preserved.'

(Applause.)

That is our task." 81 CONG. REc.
8 SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 10 (1957).

1156 (1937).

9JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDIcIAL SUPREMACY 86 (1941).
'oRadio address by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 9, 1937, in
2 COMMAGER, DoCUmENTs OF AMERICAN HISTORY 563 (5th ed. 1949).
"x"The three horses are, of course, the three branches of governmentthe Congress, the executive, and the courts. Two of the horses are pulling in
unison today; the third is not." Ibid.
2 "We have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where we must take
action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself.
We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself. We want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the
Constitution-not over it. In our courts we want a government of laws and
not of men." Id. at 564-65.
13

"[My proposal] . . . has two chief purposes . . . secondly, to bring to

the decision of social and economic problems younger men who have had per-
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inclined to yield office; 14 of setting itself up as a superlegislature. 15 The President went so far as to summon up
the days of the bank failures during the Depression 16 in a
cleverly worded emotional appeal for passage of his bill.
The Democratic Platform of 1936 had spoken vaguely
of a constitutional amendment "clarifying" legislative
rights.' 7 The President now boldly asserted that this unclear hint had been an express statement that an amendment
would be a weapon of last resort, to be used "only if every
other possible means by legislation were to fail." 18 In other
words, the claim made by the President was that he had had
a statute in mind all along.
The battle over the President's proposal was prolonged 19
and severe. 20 The New Deal forces suffered an early and
serious defeat when the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
sonal experience and contact with modern facts and circumstances under which
average men have to live and work. This plan will save our National Constitution from hardening of the judicial arteries." Id. at 565.
14 "But chance and the disinclination of individuals to leave the Supreme
Bench have now given us a Court in which five Justices will be over 75 years
of age before next June and one over 70. Thus a sound public policy has
been defeated." Id. at 566.
15 "The Court in addition to the proper use of its judicial functions has
improperly set itself up as a third House of the Congress-a super-legislature,
as one of the Justices has called it-reading into the Constitution words and
implications which are not there, and which were never intended to be there."
Id. at 564.
16 "We are at a crisis ....
It is a quiet crisis. There are no lines of depositors outside closed banks. But to the far-sighted it is far-reaching in its
possibilities of injury to America." Id. at 563.
17 Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention (1936):
"We have sought and will continue to seek to meet these (national) problems through legislation within the Constitution.
"If these problems cannot be effectively solved by legislation within the
Constitution, we shall seek such clarifying amendment as will assure to the
legislatures of the several States and to the Congress of the United States,
each within its proper jurisdiction, the power to enact those laws which the
State and Federal legislatures, within their respective spheres, shall find necessary in order adequately to regulate commerce, protect public health and safety
and safeguard economic security. Thus we propose to maintain the letter and
spirit of the Constitution."
1I Radio address by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 9, 1937, in
2 COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HisToRy 563, 565 (5th ed. 1949).
19 The matter was not definitively disposed of until August 1937.
20 See Smith, The Present Situation, in the Fight to Save the Court, 23
A.B.A.J. 401 (1937) ; Wilkinson, The President's Plan Respecting the Supreme
Court, 6 FORDHAM L. REv. 179 (1937) ; S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937), recommending rejection of the President's proposal: "We recommend
the rejection of this bill as a needless, futile, and utterly dangerous abandonment of constitutional principle." Ibid.
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recommended against passage.2 1 What made the action particularly portentious was that seven of the ten adverse votes
were cast by Democratic Senators. 2 2 Ultimately, the entire
plan was scrapped in favor of an innocuous substitute not
affecting the membership of the Supreme Court in any
degree.23 The defeat of the President's plan was compounded
of many factors. Chief among these were the death of the
majority leader of the Senate, Senator Joseph T. Robinson
of Arkansas, whose great prestige 24 had made him an indispensable ally to the President in the struggle; the retirement from the Supreme Court, in June 1937, of Mr. Justice
Willis Van Devanter of Wyoming; 25 and the statesmanship
of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes.2 6
However, time and human mortality gave to President
Roosevelt what the Congress of the United States would not.
Before his own death on April 12, 1945, he had appointed
eight 278 new members of the Court and designated a new
2
Chief.
The 1937 crisis saw the Court cast as the darling of the
conservatives of the United States. 29 Twenty years have
wrought a great change in allegiances. The Court today to
21 S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
William H. King (D., Utah); Frederick Van Nuys (D., Ind.); Patrick

22

McCarran

(D., Nev.); Carl A. Hatch (D., N.M.); Edward R. Burke

(D., Neb.); Tom Connally (D., Tex.); Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D., Wyo.).

23 Judiciary Reform Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 751 (1937).
24 Senator Robinson's stature as a Southern leader was most useful to the

President. He had been Democratic vice-presidential candidate in 1928. On
his sudden death in 1937, he was succeeded as majority leader by the late
W. Barkley of Kentucky.
Alben
2
5 Mr.Justice Van Devanter had served on the Court since 1910. He was
succeeded by Mr. Justice Hugo Black of Alabama.
26 See PusaY, CHARLES EvANs HUGHES (1951), especially the chapter
"Court-Packing Fight."
27 Hugo L. Black (1937); Stanley F. Reed (1938); Felix Frankfurter
(1939); William 0. Douglas (1939); Frank Murphy (1940); James F.
Byrnes (1941); Robert H. Jackson (1941); Wiley B. Rutledge (1943).
25 Harlan Fiske Stone was designated in 1941 by President Roosevelt to
succeed Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice of the United States.
29 Among the great spate of contemporary articles, consult the following:
Pepper, The President's Case Against the Supreme Court, 23 A.B.A.J. 247
(1937) ; Lecher, The President'sSupreme Court Plan, 23 A.B.A.J. 242 (1937) ;
Knox, President's Proposals with Respect to the Federal Courts, 23 A.B.A.J.
413 (1937).

26
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the professed conservative 30 is anathema, and to the liberal 31
the paramount guardian of American liberty. The present
Chief Justice, for example, has been described from the conservative side as a "modern Thaddeus Stevens" and portrayed
as guided solely by political expediency. 2
Impeachment of
a number of the Justices has been proposed with conviction
and enthusiasm, if not with hope of success. 3 3 To the opposing political brethren, however, the Court's approach and
trend of decision has been inspiring.
The current intense anger against the Court stems from
many sources. Decisions as to the segregation of the races
in public schools, 34 the rights of American servicemen in foreigu countries,3" the power of the states to punish sedition, 36
and to act against believed subversive elements in their own
governmental structure,3 7 have all contributed to the felt
dissatisfaction. Unprecedented construction of trade regulatory statutes, 38 as well as the inspection rights of the accused,3 9 has intensified the feeling.
For good or ill, then, the Supreme Court of the United
States is at this writing unwontedly prominent on the stage
of history and in the literate public consciousness. The ultimate thrust of this prominence, the wisdom of the actions
which brought it about, will almost certainly remain in the
cauldron of debate for some little time. Perhaps the development is pernicious. Or perhaps it exemplifies in the
highest degree Jefferson's comment to Madison, 40 Malo
periculosam libertatem quam quiet mvservitutem. Whatever
one's judgment as to its desirability, it remains a fact.
30 Typical are the strictures often found in the avowedly conservative
weekly periodical NATIONAL REVIEW.
31 Speech by Senator Harry F. Byrd (D., Va.) during Civil Rights debate,

1957.
32

Cartoon, N.Y. Daily News, October 13, 1957.

33 This is the course suggested by the Georgia Legislature.
34 See especially Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling

v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
35 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
36 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
37 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
38 United States v. E. I. Du Pont, 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
39 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
40

Letter to James Madison, January 30, 1787, reprinted in

COMPLETE JEFFERSON

270 (1943).

PADOVER,

THE
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It cannot be gainsaid that in any context a position of
great prominence is a position of risk. This is not to suggest
that the Court, in defining its area of operation or in selecting cases for decision, should play the part of the coward.
But the inescapable dangers of its present posture should be
considered. How well-equipped is the Court to withstand a
public storm or a repetition of its 1937 ordeal? Alexander
Hamilton's summary of the Court's share in the distribution
of power in our federal system has never been surpassed for
its terseness and its candor:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.
The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword
of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen
are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence
over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength
or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will,
but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of
the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power.

....

41

Certainly, the very seat and source of our Supreme
Court's influence and authority in our national life lies in
the doctrine of judicial review, as authoritatively expounded
in Marbury v. Madison4 2 by Chief Justice John Marshall.
The assertion of the power was guilefully done.43 Certainly,
4THE FDEALISr No. 78 (McLean's ed. 1788) (Hamilton).
421 U.S. (1 Cranch) 368 (1803).

43 See Corwin, Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review,
12 MIcH. L. REv. 538, 543 (1914): "The court was bent on reading the

President a lecture on his legal and moral duty to recent Federalist appointees

to judicial office, whose commissions the last Administration had not had time
to deliver, but at the same time hesitated to invite a snub by actually asserting
jurisdiction of the matter. It therefore took the engaging position of declining

to exercise power which the Constitution withheld from it, by making the
occasion an opportunity to assert a far more transcendent power."
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though, it had much support in American and British history.44 The doctrine has caused wonderment and admiration
in foreign observers. Thus, de Tocqueville was moved to say:
the Americans have acknowledged the right of judges to found
their decisions on the Constitution rather than on the laws. In other
words, they have permitted them not to apply such laws as may
appear to them to be unconstitutional.
Whenever a law that the judge holds to be unconstitutional is
invoked in a tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it
as a rule; this power is the only one peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to immense political influence.4"
And yet it should be carefully noted that the power has
not gone unchallenged. It has been the subject of savage
attack.46 Indeed, President Roosevelt brushed threateningly
close to questioning its propriety, when, in one of his
speeches in 1937 about the Court over the radio networks, he
commented:
For nearly 20 years [after the adoption of the Constitution]
there was no conflict between the Congress and the Court. Then,
in 1803, . . . the Court claimed the power to declare it [a statute]
unconstitutional and did so declare it. But a little later the Court
itself admitted that it was an extraordinary power to exercise and
through Mr. Justice Washington laid down this limitation upon it:
"It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the
patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to
presume in favor of its validity until its violation of the Constitution
is proved beyond all reasonable doubt."
But since the rise of the modern movement for social and economic progress through legislation, the Court has more and more
often and more and more boldly asserted a power to veto laws passed

41See BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912) ; Melvin,
The Judicial Bulwark of the Contitution, 8 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 167 (1914);
THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 78, 80 (Hamilton); THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS (1908);
Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law,
42 HARV. L. Rrv. 149, 365 (1928-1929).
45 1 DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 100-01 (1945 ed.).
46 See, e.g., 1 BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932).
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State legislatures in complete disregard of this
by the Congress and
47
original limitation.
The power to invalidate an act of Congress has, however,

been sparingly exercised by the Court. Thus, out of 40,000
cases decided by the Supreme Court up to 1936, only eighty-

48
four provisions of law were in some respect invalidated.

This is a rather amazing statistical picture. These objective
data, standing alone, would certainly tend to refute the pic-

ture of a Court intoxicated with power, thirsting to force its
views on the coordinate branches of government. This conclusion becomes even more appealing when we consider

that since 1937, the "new" Court, the Roosevelt-TrumanEisenhower bench, has "declared invalid only three federal

statutes, and not one of these three laws was a legislative
measure of great significance." 19 As to the executive branch,
the lesson rather harshly " read to President Truman in
Youngstoun Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,"1 wherein it was
held that he was acting unconstitutionally when he had issued

an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the nation's steel mills, represents the leading example of really dramatic decision by the
Court in the last twenty years in the area of challenge and
rebuke to the coordinate branches. And this performance
moved so eminent a scholar as Professor Edward S. Corwin

to characterize it as "a judicial brick without straw." 52

47 Radio address of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 9, 1937, in
2 COMMAGER, DOCUmENTs OF AMERICAN HISTORY 563, 564 (5th ed. 1949).

48 PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE SUPREME

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

(Government Printing Office 1936).

49 SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT 26 (1957).

SOThus, Mr. Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the Court in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952): "The
Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone
in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical
events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their
choice." Id. at 589. And Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring: "The appeal,
however, that we declare the existence of inherent powers ex necessitate to
meet an emergency asks us to do what many think would be wise, although
it is something the forefathers omitted. They knew what emergencies were,
knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how
they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that they
suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies."

649-50.

51343 U.S. 579 (1952).
52

Comment, 53 CoLum. L. REy. 53 (1953).

Id. at
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The relatively rare use of the power to strike down
acts of Congress proves the accuracy of Professor Noel T.
Dowling's " colorful observation that only when it is driven
to the wall does the Court turn and stab to death the statute.
It also instills serious reservations as to the Court's real
effectiveness as a brake on a program of legislation backed by
overwhelming popular support. Indeed, speaking even of the
1933-1937 Court, perhaps the most vigorous of all in its resistance to what it deemed legislative incursion, former
Justice Roberts, who had been a member of that Court,
commented in 1951: "Looking back, it is difficult to see how
the Court could have resisted the popular urge for uniform
standards throughout the country-for what in effect was a
unified economy."

54

The low incidence of invalidation of congressional acts
is one of the consequences of what the Court itself has described as its over-all policy of "strict necessity" in disposing
of constitutional issues. 5 Speaking of this policy, the Court
has said:
Time and experience have given it sanction.

They also have

verified . . .that the choice was wisely made. Any other indeed
might have put an end to or seriously impaired the distinctively
American institution of judicial review.56

It is not disrespectful to suggest that the Hamiltonian
comments as to the Court's place among the three branches,5 7
the vulnerability of the Court's appellate jurisdiction to congressional restriction or abolition,58 and the numerous 11 at53 The author had the privilege of studying Constitutional Law under Professor Dowling, formerly Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law
at Columbia University School of Law. Mr. Dowling has been succeeded in
that post by Mr. Herbert Wechsler.
54 ROBERTs, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1951).
55 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568 (1947).
56 Id. at 572. (Emphasis added.)
57 See note 41 supra.
58 Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution reads in part: "In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make."
(Emphasis added.)
See RorrsCHAEER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

418 (1939).

59 Thus Franklin D. Roosevelt on March 9, 1937, in a radio address, found
in 2 COMMAGER, DocumE rs OF AMEmcAN HISTORY 563, 566 (5th ed. 1949) ;
"Is it a dangerous precedent for the Congress to change the number of
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tempts by strong Presidents to change the composition of the
Court's personnel, have all contributed to what has over the
years revealed itself as a certain professed judicial diffidence.
The lines of the policy were carefully delineated by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his noted concurring opinion in Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority: 60
The Court has frequently called attention to the "great gravity
and delicacy" of its function in passing upon the validity of an act
of Congress; and has restricted exercise of this function by rigid insistence that the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual
cases and controversies; and that they have no power to give advisory
opinions. On this ground it has in recent years ordered the dismissal
of several suits challenging the constitutionality of important acts of
Congress ...
The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has
avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions
pressed upon it for decision. They are:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding ....
2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." ...
3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be
applied." .. .
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground on which the case may be disposed of....
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation....
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a
statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits....
the Justices? The Congress has always had, and will have, that power. The
number of Justices has been changed several times before--in the administrations of John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, both signers of the Declaration
of Independence, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Ulysses S. Grant."
60297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised,
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided. 61
It is submitted that the basic issue presently dividing
the critics from the friends of the Court is the genuineness
of this professed judicial reluctance to make definitive constitutional rulings. Most of the current strictures put upon
the Court rest on the premise-perhaps inarticulated, perhaps
even unrealized-that it is arrogating power to itself in fields
never envisioned by the Framers or by Justices of an earlier
day and not to this day authorized by the Constitution, as
properly interpreted.
In exploring this question, the nub of present controversy, it must be acknowledged that the Court, in time of
war and, occasionally, in hours of domestic emergency, has
acted with a reluctance, or even a timidity, that has reached
the bounds of the dismaying. Certainly, the decision in the
Japanese relocation case 62 sustaining the forcible removal
from their homes of American citizens of Japanese ancestry,
under Executive Order, offers sorry confirmation of the ancient maxim, Inter arma silent leges. It forcibly brings to
mind Mr. Jefferson's comment: "In times of peace the people
look most to their representatives; but in war, to the executive solely." 63 It will forever stand in unhappy contrast to
the courageous position taken by Chief Justice Taney in
61Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936).
LAW AND POLITICS

See also

FRANKFURTER,

25 (1939):

"But the Court has improved upon the common law tradition and evolved

rules of judicial administration especially designed to postpone constitutional
adjudications and therefore constitutional conflicts until they are judicially
unavoidable. The Court will avoid decision on grounds of constitutionality
if a case may go off on some other ground as, for instance, statutory

construction.
"The Court has thus evolved elaborate and often constitutional adjudica-

tion. In one famous controversy, involving a conflict between Congress and
the president, the Supreme Court was able until recently to avoid decision of
a question that arose in the First Congress. Such a system inevitably introduces accidental factors in decision making. So much depends on how a
question is raised and when it is raised."
62 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
63 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Caesar A. Rodney, 1810.
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Ex parte Merryman,6 4 in an earlier war. There the Court
moved decisively to force President Lincoln to release from
military custody a civilian unlawfully detained.
65
Nor is the decision of the Court in In re Yamashita,
sustaining the power of a military commission to try Japanese
General Yamashita for violations of the laws of war after the
hostilities had stopped, calculated to thrill the reader. Only
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge 66 strikes a
redeeming note. Most disturbing of all was the failure anywhere in the lengthy bill of charges to allege that the General
had authorized any of the atrocities committed by the troops
under his command, or indeed that he even had knowledge
of them.
Similarly distressing was the holding by the Court in
Falbo 'v. United States " that in a prosecution under the
Selective Service Act of 1940,68 proof that the draft board in
question had acted wholly without basis in fact was not even
admissible as a defense.6 9 These decisions stand ill in the
annals of a people that experienced such revulsion from
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's support of the German
invasion of Belgium in 1914 on the ground that necessity
knows no law.
In the field of internal affairs, it is difficult to resist the
that the decision in Norman v. Baltimore &
conclusion
O.R.R., 70 sustaining the 1933 Joint Resolution of Congress
declaring "gold clauses" calling for payment in that medium
to be against public policy, was unaffected by what a Washington wit termed at the time "pragmatic sanctions." Open
to the same criticism is Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell,7 1 endorsing a state mortgage moratorium law
against attack under the contract clause.
More recently, and in an entirely different area, the area
of what we might call "Cold War Litigation," the Court's
6

17 Fed. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
See Pim, THE CASE OF GENERAL

65 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
6 Id. at 41.

67 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
o8 54 Stat 885 (1940).

YAMASHITA (1945).

69 Compare the later decisions as reviewed by McGranery, D.J., in Ex parte
Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
70294 U.S. 240 (1935).
711290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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upholding 72 of severe disciplining and imprisonment for contempt of the attorney for the so-called first-string Communists
is bound, in view of all the circumstances, to stir misgivings
even, and perhaps especially, among the most conservative of
our people. It is difficult to read the appendix of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter 73 in this case without a stabbing pang of regret
that matters were permitted to develop as they did. And yet
the episode has gone largely unnoticed, even in the most
compendious compilations. 74 In some casebooks 7'it has not
even been deemed worthy of a citation. Our particular feelings as to the Communist movement in the United Statesand I for one would have been happier, had Bolshevism been
strangled in the cradle 7 6 -must never be permitted to obscure
the peril and the glory of the lawyer in defending the hated
cause. Surely Mr. Justice Murphy was right when he cautioned us 77-in immemorial terms-that the advocate must
always cut cleanly through the screen of transitory emotions
to defend his cause, whatever the cost and the reproach
may be.
Thus, we have recorded some displays by the Court of
caution or restraint believed to be excessive and unwarranted.
Were this behavior characteristic of the Court, it would not
figure largely in the national consciousness today. It is the
alleged reaching by the Justices for power not properly theirs
that is at the base of the current strife concerning the Court.
It is submitted that if this improper reaching has occurred,
it has been very principally with respect to federal-state
relations.
78
Upon the death of the beloved Louis D. Brandeis,
Mr. Justice Stone, in delivering his eulogy, was impelled to
say, "Justice Brandeis revered this Court as .. .the indis72

Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).

73 Id. at 42.
74 See, e.g., the exceedingly brief reference in the two-volume work, FREUND,
SUTHERLAND, HOWE, & BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND OTHER

(1943).
E.g., DODD, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1954).
With acknowledgment to Sir Winston Churchill, Address to Washington,
D.C., Press Club, June 28, 1954.
77 Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 561 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
78 Mr. Justice Brandeis (1856-1941) served as an Associate Justice from
1916 to 1939.
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pensable implement for the maintenance of our federal
system." 79 Surely a beautiful sentiment. But has the Court
been an implement of maintenance or destruction?
Enough has been developed herein to demonstrate that
with respect to the Executive and to the National Legislature, the Court has on the whole SO followed a policy of conservatism and caution during the last twenty years. But
with respect to State power the Court has felt no inhibiting
influence. Perhaps the theme of recent times was never better expressed than when Mr. Justice Stone, in United
States v. Darby,"' rather insouciantly declared of the Tenth
Amendment:
Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment which
provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people." The amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.8 2
Perhaps Mr. Justice Stone's use of lower case type when
speaking of the states, a use unjustified by the original text
of the Constitution,8 3 was symbolic. The Tenth Amendment
had been judicially executed and quickly and quietly interred
in a constitutional graveyard, probably to waken nevermore.
Much might be said of the Stone comment, from the viewpoint
of respect for tradition, scholarly analysis, or concern for the
future. Perhaps it suffices to put next to Mr. Stone's statement the words of the great Marshall in Marbury v. Madison:
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is
4
inadmissible, unless the words require it.8
In concluding this article, we turn now to examine various facets of our federal system concerning which the Court
has, in recent years, taken decisive action:
79 317

U.S. XLVIII (1942).

80 The Youngstown opinion must be borne in mind here, of course.
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(1) The Commerce Clause. Long regarded as a restriction on the States rather than as an affirmative grant to the
Congress,"5 the commerce clause has, since 1937, become the
source of a virtually all-inclusive federal power. Beginning
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation8 6 and
culminating in Wickard v. Filburn.,8 the Court has given
us an interpretation of the clause which leaves no litigable
restraints on the Congress in this area. If Congress now
wishes to regulate an activity under the commerce power,
it would be folly for one who felt himself aggrieved even
to question its assertion. Professor Dowling summarizes the
development:
But if, as has been said, the line of development of national
power was fixed by the Gibbons and Darby cases, it needs now to
be said that Wickard v. Filburnwent to the end of the line-possibly
overran it. The upshot of the case was to establish the competency
of Congress, through quotas for marketing, to impose its regulation
on a single farmer in respect of the amount of wheat grown on his
own farm solely for consumption there. No element of production of
goods for the market, whether interstate or intrastate, was present.

But farm production and consumption might be considered, in the
aggregate, as constituting a threat to the stability of the market as a
whole. The wheat "overhangs" the market; a rise in price might
draw it in. Even if not marketed, it supplies a need which would
otherwise be reflected by purchase in the open market. The case
swept out all notions, such as prevailed when the original Agricultural Adjustment Act was held invalid in United States v. Butler,
that production was beyond the reach of Congress; it swept in the
full-fledged doctrine that Congress has power to" deal with the economic affairs of the country generally; it almost swept the Court out
of the job of acting as a check to the power of Congress. Effective
restraints on the exercise of the commerce power by Congress "must
proceed from political rather than judicial processes." That is the
way suggested in the opinion, with never a questioning, much less
88
dissenting, voice from any quarter.

This sweeping definition and extension of the federal
commerce power, standing alone, would inevitably trouble
85

See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

86 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

87 Wickard v. Filburn, supra note 85.
88 PRc. L. INST., SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW DURING THE
WAR YEARS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (1946).
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some observers as to the future of our federal system. Chief
89
Justice Marshall, in MoCulloch v. Maryland,
took to be
beyond sensible consideration the notion of a central government for the United States, saying:
No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking
down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the
American people into one common mass.9 0
Nevertheless, in this undramatic area of the commerce
clause, unknown to the general public, the Court has worked
enormous change toward the result considered unworthy of
discussion by Marshall, change which affects the average citizen in the highest degree even in his obliviousness. Undoubtedly, many will wave aside the Marshall comment as
an unimportant relic of the past. Those who feel so would
do well to read how Bertrand Russell-to summon a surprise
witness-speaks of them:
Our age is the most parochial since Homer ....
It is in the
chronological sense that we are parochial: as the new names conceal
the historic cities of Prague, Nijni-Novgorod, and Pekin, so new
catchwords hide from us the thoughts and feelings of our ancestors,
even when they differed little from our own. We imagine ourselves
at the apex of intelligence, and cannot believe that the quaint clothes
and cumbrous phrases of former times can have invested people and
thoughts that are still worthy of our attention. If Hamlet is to be
interesting to a really modem reader, it must first be translated into
the language of Marx or of Freud, or, better still, into a jargon inconsistently compounded of both. 91
(2) The Equal Protection Clause-Rece Relations. In
Brown v. Board of Education," the Supreme Court held
that segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other
"tangible" factors may be equal, deprives the children of the
minority group of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe9 3
894 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).

goId. at 420.
91 RUSSELL,

On Being Modern-minded,

92347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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65 (1950).
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reached the same conclusion under the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment, with respect to the public schools of
the District of Columbia. Very recently, the Court held that
Girard College in Philadelphia was a state agency and hence
subject to the Brownv rule.9 4 Held for naught was a will
provision establishing the college but restricting admission
to "poor white male orphans."
However unwise, from a point of view of plain construction of documents, the decision in the Girard College case
may be, Broun. and Bolling seem handsomely justified by
morality and by a logical interpretation of the phrase "equal
protection." The second Broima decision,9 5 moreover, shows
a keen awareness by the Court of the explosive social problems involved, and a distinct rejection of any insistence upon
6
hasty or ill-considered implementation of its decision.
The storm beats loudest and wildest about the Court in
this area. Yet the writer does not believe that these decisions
represent any usurpation by the Justices. With all due allowance for the sectional problems and passions raised by
them, it seems irrefutable that separateness in facilities
denies equality and breeds a feeling of inferiority among the
segregated "that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone." 91
Admittedly, the segregation decisions 9 have badly
strained federal-state relations. These strains will, however.
in all probability prove temporary. Taking the larger view,
94 Pennsylvania v. Board, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
95 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
96 "Once . . . a start has been made, the courts may find that additional
[T]he
time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner ....

courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel,
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve
a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis,
and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving
the foregoing problems. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans
the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system." Id. at 300-01
(Warren, C.J.).
97 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
98 In addition to the Brown and Bolling decisions, see Pennsylvania v. Board,
supra note 94; Hawkins v. Board, 350 U.S. 413 (1956) ; Lucy v. Adams, 350
U.S. 1 (1955); Mayor v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
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they seem certain to give way to a strengthened national
fabric.
(3) State Action Against Internal Subversion. In
Pennsylvania v. Nelson,9 9 the Court held that the federal
act prohibiting the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of
the Government of the United States by force and violence
superseded the enforceability of the Pennsylvania act proscribing the same conduct. This was done in the face of a
strong disclaimer by the Department of Justice that the administration of the various state laws had hampered or impeded enforcement of the federal act. In Slochower v.
Board of Higher Education.10 0 the Court ruled that a city
had no right to require its employees either to give evidence
regarding facts of official conduct within their knowledge or
to give up the positions they hold. To paraphrase the dissent
of Mr. Justice Harlan, New York was not permitted to say
that it would not employ teachers who refused to cooperate
with public authorities when asked questions relating to
official conduct.
Taken in conjunction with Schware v. Board of Ex,10 2 overruling state
aminers 101 and Konigsberg v. Californiai
judgment and state standards with regard to admission to
the Bar of their own courts, these decisions strike heavily
at state power. A state cannot punish subversion. It cannot
compel its employees to testify as to their official conduct.
It cannot control the membership of its local Bar. Matters
of more intimate concern to the well-being, even the existence
of the states, are difficult to conceive.
Further, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,10 3 the Court
denied to a state the right to probe subversive activities
within its borders by utilizing the State Attorney General
as a one-man legislative committee under a broad grant of
power. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark (joined
in by Mr. Justice Burton) complained:
13350 U.S. 497 (1956).

100350 U.S. 551 (1956).

'101353 U.S. 232 (1957).
102353 U.S. 252 (1957).
193 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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The short of it is that the Court blocks New Hampshire's effort
to enforce its law. I had thought that in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 . . . (1956), we had left open for legitimate state
control any subversive activity leveled against the interest of the State.
I for one intended to suspend state action only in the field of subversion against the nation and thus avoid a race to the courthouse
door between federal and state prosecutors ....
I thought we had
left open a wide field for state action, but implicit in the opinions
today is a contrary conclusion. They destroy the fact-finding power
of the State in this field and I dissent from this wide sweep of their
104
coverage.
(4) Other Areas. Were space to permit, it would be
easy to dilate at length upon other areas wherein the Supreme
Court has struck deeply into state power. No doubt, many
students of political and constitutional history regard this as
a healthy, as well as an inevitable, development. No doubt
they will assure us that Hegel's zeitgeist is here at work.
But at least let us be clear that the blows have been struck.
In the fields of state taxation of interstate commerce, 0 5
state permission of released time or other religious programs
as part of a public educational system,'0 6 state efforts to police
obscene or blasphemous publications or other forms of expression, 0 7 the Court has spoken with an unsure and confusing, if not conflicting, voice. State power is hobbled, if
not by restriction, then at least by the gravest uncertainty.
The dimensions of future development are obscure.
So ends this brief survey of the place of the Supreme
Court of the United States in contemporary American life.
In its ending, it may be useful to us, as a guide to perspective
and a reminder of our heritage, to reflect upon the words of
Daniel Webster, delivered in another time of crisis, but
strong with meaning for us today:
Under the present Constitution, wisely and conscientiously administered, all are safe, happy, and renowned. The measure of our
1'0
Id. at 269 (dissenting opinion).
105 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
106 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ; Emerson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
107 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Butler v. Michigasn,
352 U.S. 380 (1957); Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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country's fame may fill all our breasts. It is fame enough for us all
to partake in her glory, if we will carry her character onward to its
true destiny. But if the system is broken, its fragments must fall
alike on all. Not only the cause of American liberty, but the grand
cause of liberty throughout the whole earth, depends, in a great measure, on upholding the Constitution and Union of these States. If
shattered and destroyed, no matter by what cause, the peculiar and
cherished idea of United American Liberty will be no more forever ....
A common fate awaits us. In the honor of upholding,
or in the disgrace of undermining the Constitution, we shall all
necessarily partake. Let us then stand by the Constitution as it is,
and by our country as it is, one, united, and entire; let it be a truth
engraven on our hearts, let it be borne on the flag under which we
rally, in every exigency, that we have one Country, one Constitution,
one Destiny.10

10 Address by Daniel Webster, Niblo's Saloon, New York, N.Y., March
15, 1837, reprinted in 2 WRITING AND SPEECES OF DANIEL WEnssmz 193
(1903).

